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Abstract. Increases in government spending trigger substitution eﬀects—both
inter- and intra-temporal—and a wealth eﬀect. The ultimate impacts on the econ-
omy hinge on current and expected monetary and ﬁscal policy behavior. Studies
that impose active monetary policy and passive ﬁscal policy typically ﬁnd that
government consumption crowds out private consumption: higher future taxes cre-
ate a strong negative wealth eﬀect, while the active monetary response increases
the real interest rate. This paper estimates Markov-switching policy rules for the
United States and ﬁnds that monetary and ﬁscal policies ﬂuctuate between ac-
tive and passive behavior. When the estimated joint policy process is imposed
on a conventional new Keynesian model, government spending generates positive
consumption multipliers in some policy regimes and in simulated data in which
all policy regimes are realized. The paper reports the model’s predictions of the
macroeconomic impacts of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s implied
path for government spending under alternative monetary-ﬁscal policy combina-
tions.
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sis” at Princeton University for comments. Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, troy.davig@kc.frb.org; Department of Economics, Indiana University and NBER,
eleeper@indiana.edu. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessar-
ily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Monetary and ﬁscal policy responses to the recession of 2007-09 have been un-
usually aggressive, particularly in the United States. The Federal Reserve rapidly
reduced the federal funds rate more than 500 basis points, beginning in the summer
of 2007, and the rate has eﬀectively been at its zero bound since December 2008.
Early in 2009 the U.S. Congress passed the $787 billion American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, in addition to the $125 billion provided by the Economic Stimu-
lus Act of 2008. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009) projects that the Federal
deﬁcit will be 13 percent of GDP in 2009 and, with the passage of President Obama’s
budget, deﬁcits will hover around 5 percent of GDP through 2019; as a consequence,
government debt as a share of GDP is expected to rise from 40 percent in 2008 to 80
percent in 2019. With the exception of wars and the Great Depression, the projected
speed of debt accumulation is unprecedented in the United States. This uniﬁed and
aggressive monetary-ﬁscal front to stimulate the economy is a distinctive feature of
the current policy response.
The overriding objective of the stimulus eﬀorts is to spur job creation by increasing
aggregate demand, particularly in the short run [Romer and Bernstein (2009), Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2008)]. Because private consumption
constitutes about two-thirds of GDP, the typical argument has stimulus raise con-
sumption demand, the demand for labor, and employment. It is ironic that the
consumption response to an increase in government spending is the linchpin in the
transmission mechanism for ﬁscal stimulus: economic theory and empirical evidence
do not universally support the idea that higher government purchases raise private
consumption.
Two features of the macro policy response have received little modeling attention,
despite being central to the predictions of the impacts of the policy actions. First,
monetary and ﬁscal policy have reacted jointly in an eﬀort to stimulate aggregate
demand. A long line of research emphasizes that separating monetary and ﬁscal poli-
cies overlooks policy interactions that are important for determining equilibrium.
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Second, few economic observers expect that the current recession-ﬁghting mix of
macro policies will persist indeﬁnitely; eventually, policies will return to “normal.”
Because the impacts of current policies depend, in part, on expectations of possible
1Examples include Sargent and Wallace (1981), Wallace (1981), Aiyagari and Gertler (1985),
Sims (1988), and Leeper (1991).POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 2
future monetary-ﬁscal policy regimes, predictions need to condition on the current
regime and incorporate prospective future regimes.
2 Intertemporal aspects of mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy interactions determine how any ﬁscal stimulus is expected to
be ﬁnanced, which theory suggests is a critical determinant of the eﬃcacy of the
stimulus.
This paper addresses these two features in a conventional dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) model with nominal price rigidities and complete speciﬁca-
tions of monetary and ﬁscal policies. The model embeds the possibility that policy
rules may evolve over time according to a known probability distribution and that
private agents form expectations of policy according to that distribution. We esti-
mate simple interest rate and tax policy rules whose parameters are governed by a
Markov chain. The estimated joint monetary-ﬁscal policy process is inserted into
the calibrated DSGE model. Government spending, which is a central focus of the
analysis, evolves exogenously.
In this setting, an increase in unproductive government spending sets in motion
both intra- and inter-temporal substitution eﬀects, as well as a wealth eﬀect.
3,4 Rel-
ative sizes of these eﬀects determine how real wages, employment, consumption, and
inﬂation react. Typical analyses assume passive ﬁscal behavior, which couples higher
government spending with an equivalent increase in lump-sum taxes to pay for the
spending, while the analyses also assume active monetary policy [see, for example,
Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2007), and
Monacelli and Perotti (2008)].5 Under this set of policies, the intra-temporal sub-
stitution eﬀect is triggered when higher government spending increases aggregate
demand and, because output is demand-determined, raises the demand for labor. As
2Work along these lines is more limited, but includes Leeper and Zha (2003), Davig and Leeper
(2006), Chung, Davig, and Leeper (2007), and Davig and Leeper (2007), Svensson and Williams
(2007, 2008), Bianchi (2009), and Farmer, Zha, and Waggoner (2009).
3We use the term “unproductive” government spending to refer to those government purchases
of goods and services that do not directly enhance the production possibilities or productivity of
private ﬁrms.
4Monacelli and Perotti (2008) nicely explain how these mechanisms operate under ﬂexible and
sticky prices and under the two sets of preference speciﬁcations due to King, Plosser, and Rebelo
(1988) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988).
5Monetary policy is passive when the central bank raises the nominal interest rate only weakly
in response to inﬂation and ﬁscal policy is active when taxes and spending do not adjust in order
to stabilize government debt [Leeper (1991)].POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 3
the real wage rises, households work harder, substituting consumption for leisure.
An increase in the real wage is necessary for government spending to have a positive
eﬀect on private consumption. Higher real wages increase ﬁrms’ marginal costs and
cause them to raise prices, if given the opportunity under the Calvo (1983) pricing
mechanism.
Inter-temporal eﬀects work through the real interest rate, whose movements de-
pend on how monetary policy responds to changes in inﬂation arising from changes
in government purchases. When prices are sticky, an increase in government pur-
chases gradually raises the price level, thereby raising the expected path of inﬂation.
An active monetary response raises the nominal interest rate sharply, which raises
the real rate and induces agents to postpone consumption. Higher taxes create a
negative wealth eﬀect that shifts out the supply of labor—when leisure is a normal
good—further increasing hours worked, but oﬀsetting at least some of the increase
in real wage. Most importantly, because consumption is also a normal good, higher
taxes induce households to shift down their consumption paths, ultimately reducing
equilibrium consumption, as Barro and King (1984) and Baxter and King (1993)
show.
Changes in government spending are most often studied in a regime with active
monetary and passive ﬁscal policy. One exception is Kim (2003), who follows up on
the analysis in Woodford (1998) to show that under alternative assumptions about
the monetary-ﬁscal regime—speciﬁcally, passive monetary policy and active ﬁscal
policy—higher government spending consistently raises both output and consump-
tion. Under that alternative mix of policies, higher government spending also creates
higher expected inﬂation. Instead of raising the real rate, passive monetary policy
does not increase nominal rates strongly with inﬂation, so the real rate declines. The
lower real rate reduces the return to saving and induces agents to increase current
consumption demand. Active ﬁscal policy means that higher taxes are not expected
to fully ﬁnance the increase in government spending, and the usual negative wealth
eﬀect on labor supply and consumption is mitigated, even with standard preferences
such as those introduced by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).
These substitution and wealth eﬀects operate in the model with regime-switching
policies, but their relative sizes vary across regimes. We explain these mechanisms
using two viewpoints. The ﬁrst is from the perspective of the ﬁrms’ and households’
optimal decisions, as explained above. A second viewpoint utilizes the intertemporalPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 4
equilibrium condition that equates the real value of nominal government liabilities to
the expected present value of future net-of-interest surpluses inclusive of seigniorage
revenues.6 From this standpoint, a higher expected path of government spending,
with no associated higher path of taxes, reduces the ﬁscal backing for government
liabilities, driving down their value.7 Households convert government debt into con-
sumption, reinforcing the initial increase in aggregate demand. The value of debt
in terms of goods must fall, so the price level must rise. Regime-switching policies
imply that this debt revaluation mechanism is always in play, but its importance is
a quantitative matter, depending on the relative probabilities of various regimes.
This paper reports quantitative results. Government spending multipliers for
output—computed as the present value of the change in output as a ratio of the
present value of the change in government spending—vary from a bit below 1 to
near 2, depending on the monetary-ﬁscal regime that is assumed to prevail. The as-
sociated multipliers for consumption may be negative or close to one, depending on
the policy regime. VARs estimated from simulated data in which policies ﬂuctuate
among all four possible combinations—one active and one passive; both passive; both
active—yield mean government spending impact multipliers that peak for output at
about 1.7 and for consumption at about 0.7, close to estimates from the ﬁscal VAR
literature.
The model in this paper assumes a ﬁxed capital stock, which shuts oﬀ the possible
channel that would allow consumption to rise by crowding out investment. Thus, our
quantitative estimates are conservative relative to models that exploit this channel
to raise the consumption multiplier.
The channels through which government spending aﬀects prices and quantities in
this paper seem highly plausible. They rely only on the observation that monetary-
ﬁscal regimes have changed and are expected to continue to change over time, ﬂuc-
tuating between active and passive periods. Otherwise, the environment we study
is completely conventional. Existing methods for generating positive government
spending multipliers for consumption do not conﬂict, and likely would amplify, the
channels that this work highlights.
6Leeper and Yun (2006) develop a Slutsky-Hicks decomposition to systematically study these
eﬀects in the context of changes in distorting taxes.
7Cochrane (2005, p. 502) refers to this intertemporal equilibrium condition as a “valuation
equation for government debt.”POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 5
With the calibrated model in hand, we simulate the impacts of the government
spending component of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 un-
der alternative monetary-ﬁscal regimes. When monetary policy is active and ﬁscal
policy is passive, the ﬁscal stimulus creates a modest expansion in output and it
raises inﬂation and real interest rates, while government debt and taxes rise substan-
tially and persistently. On the other hand, passive monetary policy and active ﬁscal
policy generate an appreciably larger boom in output and consumption, and a signif-
icantly larger run-up in inﬂation, while rapidly reducing the real value of government
liabilities.
The paper concludes by considering the probable scenario that, as inﬂation rises
due to the ﬁscal stimulus, the Federal Reserve combats inﬂation by switching to
an active stance, but ﬁscal policy continues to be active. Of course, doubly active
policies, if they were expected to persist indeﬁnitely, would imply that no equilibrium
exists. With Markov switching, however, the economy can visit such a regime because
individuals expect the visit to be temporary. In this scenario, output, consumption,
and inﬂation are chronicallyhigher, while debt explodes and real interest rates decline
dramatically and persistently.
Taken together, the paper’s results argue forcefully that the impacts of a ﬁscal
stimulus cannot be understood without studying monetary and ﬁscal policies jointly.
Moreover, diﬀerent assumptions about joint monetary-ﬁscal behavior can lead to
sharply diﬀerent conclusions about the likely consequences of ﬁscal stimulus.
2. Selective Review of Work on Government Spending
In recent years, a small industry of research has sprung up to reconcile the theoreti-
cal and empirical ﬁndings about the impacts of increases in unproductive government
spending on private consumption. As initially pointed out by Barro and King (1984)
and Baxter and King (1993), neo-classical theory predicts that higher government
consumption that is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes reduces household wealth and,
therefore, the path of private consumption. In contrast, a range of empirical studies
ﬁnds that government consumption crowds in private consumption [Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), Perotti (2007), Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2007), MountfordPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 6
and Uhlig (2009)].
8 Using U.S. data, Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) estimate
the government spending multiplier for output to be 0.80 initially and rising to 1.74
after two years, while the multiplier for consumption is always positive and is 0.17 on
impact and 0.95 after two years. Monacelli and Perotti (2008) report similar results
across several empirical speciﬁcations.
A variety of theoretical channels have been suggested to ensure that the negative
wealth eﬀect on consumption does not overwhelm the substitution eﬀect. Many
suggestions amount to changing the representative household’s preferences. Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2007), for example, assume deep habits that amplify the
increase in real wages and, therefore, the size of the substitution eﬀect. Monacelli and
Perotti (2008) eliminate the wealth eﬀect on labor supply, which generates strong
complementarity between consumption and work eﬀort.
9
Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) is a departure from eﬀorts to intervene on
preferences, but the alternative is rather complex. Heterogenous agents—some fully
optimizing and others operating by rules of thumb—are combined with imperfectly
competitive labor markets—labor unions set wages—in a new Keynesian model with
sticky prices to produce positive government spending multipliers for consumption.
This paper combines an oﬀ-the-shelf new Keynesian model—described in the next
section—with estimated regime-switching monetary and ﬁscal policies to explore
more thoroughly the channel that Kim (2003) points to by which government spend-
ing can have multiplied impacts on output and, therefore, produce positive multipli-
ers for consumption.
3. A New Keynesian Model with Variable Government Purchases
The analysis is conducted in a conventional new Keynesian model with ﬁxed capi-
tal and elastic labor supply. Nominal rigidities are introduced through Calvo (1983)
8Not all empirical work supports the crowding in view. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey
(2007), for example, argue that anticipated increases in government spending reduce private
consumption.
9Bouakez and Rebei (2007) intervene on preferences by assuming private consumption and pub-
lic goods are complements. Linnemann (2006) obtains positive government spending multipliers
for consumption in a frictionless real business cycle model by assuming particular non-separable
preferences over consumption and leisure, but Bilbiie (2008) shows that Linnemann’s preferences
imply both a downward sloping labor supply function and that consumption is an inferior good.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 7
pricing by monopolistically competitive ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrms. Unproductive
government spending is ﬁnanced through a combination of lump-sum taxes, seignior-
age revenues, and one-period nominal government bonds.






















with 0 < β < 1,σ > 0,η > 0, κ > 0,χ > 0 and δ > 0, where Ct is a composite
consumption good consisting of diﬀerentiated goods, cjt, which are aggregated using
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The household chooses each good cjt to minimize total expenditure, yielding the


































where τt is lump-sum taxes/transfers, Bt is one-period nominal bond holdings, 1+rt−1
is the risk-free nominal interest rate between t − 1 and t, and Πt is proﬁts from the
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resulting in the following relation between real money balances, the nominal rate












The government’s demand for goods is in the same proportion as households,














Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for household optimization require (5)-(7) to
hold in every period and the household’s budget constraints to bind with equality.
In addition, the present value of households’ expected expenditures are bounded and










where At = Bt + Mt and qt,T = (1 + rT−1)/(PT/Pt).
3.2. Firms. A continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms produce goods using
labor. Production of good j is
yjt = ZNjt, (9)
where Z is aggregate technology, common across ﬁrms and taken to be constant.







where Yt is deﬁned by
Ct + Gt = Yt. (11)







Following Calvo (1983), a fraction 1−ϕ ﬁrms are permitted to adjust their prices
each period, while the fraction ϕ are not permitted to adjust. If ﬁrms are permittedPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 9
to adjust prices at t, they choose a new optimal price, p∗
t, to maximize the expected
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The ﬁrst-order condition that determines p∗





































where the numerator and the denominator have recursive representations:















Solving (16) for p∗





















where µ ≡ θ/(θ − 1) is the markup.
We assume that individual labor services may be aggregated linearly to produce
aggregate labor, Nt =
R 1
0 Njtdj. Linear aggregation of individual market clearingPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 10















It is natural to deﬁne aggregate proﬁts as the sum of individual ﬁrm proﬁts,
Πt =
R 1
0 Πjtdj. Integrating over ﬁrms’ proﬁts and combining the household’s and
the government’s budget constraints yields the aggregate resource constraint
Z
∆t
Nt = Ct + Gt. (22)
From the deﬁnitions of price dispersion and the aggregate price index, relative price
dispersion evolves according to









where πt = Pt/Pt−1.
Following Woodford (2003), we deﬁne potential, or the natural level of, output, Y
p
t ,
to be the equilibrium level of output that would be realized if prices were perfectly
ﬂexible. Potential output, then, emerges from the model when ϕ = 0, so all ﬁrms can
adjust prices every period. In the current setup, potential would vary systematically
with government spending, but not with monetary policy or lump-sum tax shocks.
In the empirical work, we use the Congressional Budget Oﬃce’s measure of potential
GDP, which is essentially a smooth trend for output, Y T
t ; it certainly does not
coincide with the theoretical concept of the natural level of output. To make our
theory line up with the empirical work, we deﬁne the output gap, yt, as yt = Yt−Y T
t ,
with Y T
t ≡ 1 for all t, since we abstract from growth.
4. Policy Specification
4.1. Regime-Switching Policy Rules. To account for possible changes in regime,
the policy rules take the same form as in Davig and Leeper (2006). Speciﬁcally, thePOLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 11
monetary policy rule is
rt = α0(S
M
t ) + απ(S
M
t )πt + αy(S
M





where πt is inﬂation, yt is the output gap, and εr
t ∼i.i.d. N (0,1) is the disturbance.
SM
t indicates the monetary policy regime and follows a four-state Markov chain. The
variance of the errors switches between two diﬀerent values independently of the
coeﬃcients in the rule. Since coeﬃcients may take two diﬀerent regime-dependent
values as well, there are a total of four monetary regimes. Estimates are given in
table 1 and ﬁltered and smoothed probabilities are given in ﬁgure 1. The sample runs
from 1949:Q1 to 2008:Q4. The rule also includes a dummy to account for the credit
controls in place in the early 1980s; however, its estimated value is insigniﬁcant.
The ﬁscal rule also takes the same form as in Davig and Leeper (2006). All
parameters are restricted to switch simultaneously, so a change in behavior, say in
the response of taxes to the output gap, imposes a change in the responses to debt
and government purchases. The ﬁscal rule is
τt = γ0(S
F
t ) + γb(S
F
t )bt−1 + γy(S
F
t )yt + γg(S
F





where τt isthe ratio of lump-sum taxes—deﬁnedas governmentrevenuesless transfers—
to output, bt−1 is lagged debt-to-output ratio, gt is the government purchase-to-
output ratio and ετ
t ∼ N(0,1). SF
t indicates the ﬁscal policy regime, which follows
a Markov chain with transition matrix PF. The ﬁscal rule also allows the variance
of the errors to switch between two values, but the changes are restricted to occur
simultaneously with changes in the coeﬃcients. Consequently, there are two ﬁscal
regimes. The sample ends one quarter earlier than the sample for estimating the
monetary rule due to data availability. Estimates are given in table 2 and ﬁltered
and smoothed probabilities are in ﬁgure 2.
When embedding the rules into the new Keynesian model, we aggregate the four
monetary states into two states that diﬀer across reaction coeﬃcients.10 This has no
impact on the numerical solution in the next section because, although we estimate
the policy rules allowing for random disturbances, we turn oﬀ the random shocks to
10The aggregation sums transition probabilities across volatility regimes, then weights each sum
so that the percentage of time spent in the active monetary policy regime is the same in the
two-state chain as in the four-state chain. For example, based on the deﬁnition of monetary










t = 1] + Pr[SM
t = 2]
￿
, where St is the aggregated regime, SM
t = 1 is the low-
volatility active regime and SM
t = 2 is the high-volatility active regime.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 12
taxes and monetary policy when solving the model. The only random disturbance
we consider is to government purchases.
The aggregated transition matrix for monetary policy and estimated transition














The joint transition matrix governing the monetary-ﬁscal regime is then P =
PM ⊗ PF. Figure 3 illustrates the estimated timing of the monetary-ﬁscal regime.
Throughout the ﬁrst half of the sample, monetary policy was passive, consis-
tent with estimates of Taylor rules [Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) or Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004)]. Fiscal policy, however, switched between active and passive
regimes. Monetary studies that maintain the assumption that ﬁscal policy is perpet-
ually passive would conclude that the rational expectations equilibrium is indetermi-
nate, as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) argue. The early to mid-1980s was a period
in which both policies were active, a policy mix that would imply non-existence
of equilibrium if it were expected to persist indeﬁnitely. This was also a time when
economic commentators described U.S. ﬁscal policy as unsustainable because govern-
ment debt was growing rapidly as a share of GDP. While monetary policy remained
active through the 1980s, ﬁrst under Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker and
then Chariman Alan Greenspan, ﬁscal policy adopted a passive stance as many of
the Reagan tax cuts were reversed. The recessions of 1990-91 and 2000-01 induced
monetary policy to switch to being passive, while the tax cuts of George W. Bush
are reﬂected as an active ﬁscal stance through the 2000s. The joint policy process
throughout much of the 2000s has been passive monetary policy and active ﬁscal
policy. Evidently, there is substantial instability in ﬁscal policy, but greater stability
in monetary policy behavior, an outcome also found by Favero and Monacelli (2005).





(1 − ρ) + ρlog(Gt−1) + εt, (27)
where εt ∼ N(0,σ2).POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 13
4.2. The Government’s Flow Budget Identity. The processes for {Gt,τt,Mt,Bt}
must satisfy the ﬂow government budget identity










given M−1 > 0 and (1 + r−1)B−1.
4.3. Steady-State Values. Steady-state debt levels conditional on the AM/PF,
PF/PF and PM/AF regimes are set to be equal across regimes. Mechanically, this
is done by substituting the tax rule into the budget constraint and setting output to
its deterministic steady state level of unity, then solving for the intercept in the tax



































is set to its steady-state value. An
analogous procedure is performed on the monetary policy rule, (24), and the money
demand relation, (7). As with debt, steady-state rates of inﬂation are set to be equal
across the AM/PF, PF/PF and PM/AF regimes.
For the AM/AF regime, steady-state debt is not a well deﬁned concept, since
real debt follows a nonstationary path. In this regime, an innovation to the level of
debt does not elicit a suﬃcient response from future taxes to stabilize the path of
debt. However, the active-active regime is not expected to last indeﬁnitely, as the
transversality condition on debt is satisﬁed via an expectation of a switch to a future
policy regime.
5. Solution and Calibration
We set the parameters governing preferences, technology and price adjustment
to be consistent with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003). The
model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. Firms markup the prices of their goods
over marginal cost by 15 percent, implying µ = θ(1−θ)−1 = 1.15, and 66 percent of
ﬁrms cannot reset their price each period (ϕ = .66). The quarterly real interest rate
is set to 1 percent (β = .99). Preferences over consumption are logarithmic, so σ = 1.
We also set the Frisch labor supply elasticity to unity, so η = 1 and set χ so the steady
state share of time spent in employment is 0.2. Intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms
utilize a constant-returns-to-scale production function. The technology parameter,POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 14
Z, is set to normalize the deterministic steady state level of output to unity. Steady
state inﬂation is set to 2 percent and the steady state debt-output ratio is set to .35.
For real balances, we set δ so velocity in the deterministic steady state, deﬁned as
cP/M, corresponds to the average U.S. monetary base velocity at 2.4. We take this
value from Davig and Leeper (2006), where we computed it using data from 1959-2004
on the average real level of expenditure on non-durable consumption plus services.
The parameter that determines the interest elasticity of real money balances, κ, is set
to 2.6 [Mankiw and Summers (1986), Lucas (1988), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2000)].
Coeﬃcients in the monetary and ﬁscal rules are set to their estimated values with
one exception: the coeﬃcient on government purchases in the ﬁscal rule is set to
zero. The actual estimates for these coeﬃcients are positive and imply that taxes
begin rising in the same period as the increase in government purchases. Ruling out
the immediate tax response to government purchases better isolates the impact of
government purchases. Taxes continue to respond, however, to the movements in
debt and output generated by the change in government purchases.
To obtain parameter values in the process for government purchases, we estimate
ρ and σ2 in (27) by detrending the log of real total government purchases from
1949:Q1-2009:Q1. Estimation yields a value for ρ of .9 and the value of σ2 implies a
one-standard deviation shock raises the level of government purchases 1.5%. Steady
state purchases, G, is set so purchases equal 20% of output in the deterministic
steady state.
We solve the model numerically using the monotone map method described in
Davig and Leeper (2006).
6. Dynamic Impacts of Government Purchases
In the new Keynesian framework, the general mechanisms through which a change
in government purchases aﬀects the equilibrium, regardless of the monetary-ﬁscal
regime, are:
• higher government spending raises demand for the goods sold by monopolis-
tically competitive intermediate-goods producing ﬁrms;POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 15
• intermediate-goods producing ﬁrms meet demand at posted prices by increas-
ing their demand for labor;
• higher labor demand raises real wages and real marginal costs;
• ﬁrms that have the option of reevaluating their pricing decision will increase
their prices.
These mechanisms operate across each monetary-ﬁscal regime. Also, the positive
comovement of output and prices occurs in each regime, so an unproductive govern-
ment spending shock looks like a traditional “demand” shock regardless of policy.
The policy regime, however, does play a critical role in determining the movement
of real rates, consumption and the path for inﬂation.
To highlight the diﬀerences and similarities across regimes, ﬁgure 4 reports the im-
pulse responses to a two-standard deviation shock to government purchases, which
translates to a 3 percent rise in the level of purchases, conditional on each of the
three stationary regimes. The experiment holds regime ﬁxed, although agents’ ex-
pectations functions embed the probability that regimes can change. In each regime,
output rises as government purchases increase demand, causing ﬁrms to hire more
labor and increase production. Households experience a rise in their real wage due
to the increase in demand for their labor services (i.e., they slide along their labor
supply curve), but also realize some decline in wealth arising from higher expected
tax payments. From the monopolistic ﬁrms’ perspective, the rise in the real wage
drives up their real marginal costs. Since government purchases are serially corre-
lated, the rise in marginal costs is expected to be persistent; if given the opportunity
under the Calvo pricing restrictions, an individual ﬁrm will respond to the shock by
raising its price.
Under active monetary and passive ﬁscal policy, which is the benchmark policy
conﬁguration in many studies and exhibits Ricardian equivalence in the ﬁxed-regime
setting, the monetary authority responds aggressively to the rise in inﬂation by in-
creasing the nominal rate more than one-for-one (dashed lines). As ﬁgure 4 indicates,
the monetary response persistently raises the real rate and dampens consumption
demand from households. As purchases return to their steady state level, the real
rate falls and consumption rises back to steady state. Since inﬂation remains rela-
tively subdued, seigniorage revenues play a small role in governing debt dynamics.
Taxes respond to lagged debt and rise as the government issues debt to ﬁnance the
expanded level of purchases. However, taxes do not respond suﬃciently to resultPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 16
in monotonically declining debt, so debt peaks roughly 10 periods after the initial
shock.
The dynamics of output and consumption in the active monetary/passive ﬁscal
(AM/PF) regime qualitativelyresemblethose of a standard real-business cyclemodel,
where an increase in government purchases acts as a negative shock to lifetimewealth,
which causes agents to decrease both consumption and leisure. The rise in time spent
working stimulates output, but not enough to cause consumption to rise. The drop
in consumption, both in the AM/PF regime and real business cycle model stands in
contrast to traditional Keynesian policy analysis. Textbook formulations posit that
an increase in government purchases generates dynamics—sometimes referred to as
“Keynesian hydraulics”—that produce a multiple increase in output and consump-
tion, where the multiple depends on the marginal propensity to consume [Branson
(1989)].
As discussed in the introduction, mechanisms that cause consumption to rise in
modern general equilibrium settings often require modifying preferences or introduc-
ing incomplete markets and labor market imperfections. An alternative to these
modiﬁcations is to assume a diﬀerent policy regime with passive monetary and ac-
tive ﬁscal policy. Kim (2003) shows in a ﬁxed-regime new Keynesian model that
an increase in government purchases can increase consumption under passive mon-
etary/active ﬁscal (PM/AF) policy by inducing the real rate to decline. Figure 4
demonstrates that the same mechanism exists in the regime-switching framework
(light solid lines). The increase in government purchases, which is expected to be
persistent, raises current and future demand, so raises inﬂation expectations. Under
passive monetary policy, the monetary authority responds to the increase in inﬂation
less than one-for-one and lets the real rate fall. The lower future path of the real rate
lowers the return to saving, which stimulates demand as households pull consump-
tion forward. This model holds the capital stock ﬁxed and is a closed economy, so the
increase in government purchases and consumption generates an output multiplier
greater than one and a larger increase in output than under AM/PF policy. The
large increase in output above potential generates a substantially larger increase in
inﬂation than in the AM/PF regime.
The larger response of output under passive monetary policy also raises taxes by
more on impact than under active monetary policy, since the tax rule speciﬁes taxes
rise in response to the output gap. Under passive monetary/passive ﬁscal (PM/PF)POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 17
policy, the response of taxes to output is larger than in PM/AF, so taxes increase
relatively more and debt rises by less on impact.
To better understand the debt dynamics, recall that following intertemporal equi-
librium condition must hold in every regime















which indicates that the present value of primary surpluses and seigniorage must
equal the real value of outstanding nominal government liabilities. Holding every-
thing constant except government purchases, equilibrium condition (30) implies that
an increase in government purchases, ﬁnanced by new debt issuance, lowers the
present value of primary surpluses and creates an imbalance between the initial
value of liabilities and their expected backing (i.e., the right-hand side variables).
To restore balance, a number of adjustments can occur. First, the present value
of taxes may rise by exactly the amount that government purchases changed, which
is the adjustment that occurs under a Ricardian regime. Second, the present value
of seigniorage may rise. Third, the current price level may jump, revaluing existing
liabilities. In the regime switching setting, all of these adjustments occur and the
relative importance of each adjustment for reestablishing equilibrium condition (30)
depends on the joint monetary-ﬁscal policy process.
At each point in time, real debt must be backed by the present value of primary
surpluses and seigniorage, which depend on how the policy process is expected to
evolve. A policy combination that implies less total backing will cause agents to try
to substitute out of debt holdings, which will be consistent in equilibrium with a rise
in consumption demand. The rise in demand increases the current price level to a
level that restores balance between the left- and right-hand sides of (30). The rise
in the price level can then be understood from two perspectives, either the ﬁrm’s
pricing decision or the intertemporal equilibrium condition (30).
Figure 5 decomposes the debt dynamics between changes in the present value of
primary surpluses and seigniorage, again conditional on monetary-ﬁscal regime. The
upper-left panel reports the paths for debt in diﬀerent regimes and the lower two pan-
els report the responses of the present value of primary surpluses and seigniorage.
The paths for primary surpluses and seigniorage are given in terms of percentagePOLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 18
changes, which are then weighted by their share of debt. Deﬁne xt to be the ex-
pected present value of primary surpluses and zt to be the expected present value of
seigniorage, beginning at t + 1. Rewrite (30) as Bt









where bars denote steady state values conditional on regime and hats denote the log
deviations. Equation (31) indicates that the percentage change in debt is a weighted
average of the percentage changes in the present value of surpluses and seigniorage.
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The reason for weighting the responses of primary surpluses and seigniorage in ﬁgure
5 is that the linear aggregation of each value approximates the change in debt, which
eases the interpretation of determining the driving forces behind debt dynamics.
In ﬁgure 5, debt rises under AM/PF and is backed by roughly an equal rise in both
primary surpluses and seigniorage (dashed lines). The rise in government purchases
exerts downward pressure on the present value of primary surpluses, but primary
surpluses rise because passive ﬁscal policy raises taxes. Because the real interest rate
rises, a large and persistent increase in surpluses is required to raise the present value
of surpluses. In contrast, the present value of primary surpluses falls under passive
monetary policy and seigniorage rises. The recovery of the present value of primary
surpluses to its steady state under passive policy is slow relative to the return of
seigniorage. Thus, the backing of debt actually falls below its steady state debt level
as seigniorage falls, causing debt to fall below its steady state level. Active monetary
policy, by keepingreal interest rates high, prolongs and extends the ﬁscal adjustments
that bring debt back to steady state. Passive monetary policy, by contrast, allows
jumps in inﬂation that rapidly stabilize debt by reducing its real value.
7. Government Purchase Multipliers
7.1. Impact vs. Present Value Multipliers. Empirical studies that measure the
eﬀect of exogenous changes in government purchases, such as Blanchard and Perotti





11In the ﬁgure, the sums of b xt and b zt do not exactly equal b bt due to the approximation error
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which is the increase in the level of output j periods ahead in response to an increase
in government purchases equal to size ∆Gt at time t.
There are several issues with this deﬁnition of the multiplier. First, if the process
governing government purchases is serially correlated, then a change in government
purchases portends a path of future government purchases. Measuring the impact on
output using ∆Yt+j/∆Gt does not take into account how expected future purchases
impact ∆Yt+j, so this measure can easily be biased. Second, ∆Yt+j/∆Gt is not in
present value units, so a unit increase in output 50 years in the future is treated as
equivalent to a unit increase in output this year. Without discounting, the multiplier
calculation can be a misleading guide to policy decisions.12
To remedy both of these issues, we follow the measure in Mountford and Uhlig
(2009) and report the change in the present value of additional output over diﬀerent
horizons generated by a $1 change in the present value of government purchases,
















In our context, this is the increase in the present value of output over the next k
periods, conditional on holding the prevailing monetary and ﬁscal regime ﬁxed.
7.2. Multipliers Across Monetary-Fiscal Regimes. Table 3 reports the present
value output multipliers over diﬀerent horizons conditioning on each of the station-
ary regimes. In general, the long-run government multiplier is greater than unity
for regimes with passive monetary policy, which implies the consumption multiplier
in these policy regimes is positive. The positive consumption multiplier arises for
reasons explained early—passive monetary policy allows the real rate to fall, which
raises aggregate consumption demand. The output multiplier is slightly larger under
active ﬁscal policy because agents expected lower future taxes relative to the passive
ﬁscal regime. To be precise, roughly 91 percent of the increase in government pur-
chases is backed by higher future taxes under the PM/PF regime, whereas it is 89
12Romer and Bernstein (2009) use impact multipliers to project the likely impacts of the 2009
stimulus package. One reason, however, that empirical work does not often report discounted values
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percent under the PM/AF regime. The slightly larger tax liability under the PM/PF
regime explains the slightly lower multipliers.
Table 4 reports the impacts of government purchases on the price level, which
generally mimic the pattern for the multipliers. The larger the increase in demand,
or ﬁnal output, as measured by the multipliers, the larger is the impact on the price
level. Not surprisingly, the largest impacts on the price level occurs under passive
monetary policy.
7.3. Simulating Time Series. Suppose that the model in section 3 were the true
data generating process and an econometrician employs standard VAR techniques
to identify the impacts of an exogenous change in government spending. What
multipliers for output and consumption will the econometrician obtain?
To simulate the time series we draw sequences of the government spending shock





t=1, and solve the nonlinear
model for each date t. Setting T = 500, we discard the ﬁrst 250 periods, ensuring that
the model has settled into its ergodic distribution. From this we have one sample of
equilibrium data of length 250 periods, roughly comparable to a post-war quarterly
sample. For each sample we estimate a bivariate VAR in government spending and
consumption. We order Gt ﬁrst and use a Choleski decomposition to identify an
exogenous shock to spending. The simulation is performed 571 times.13
Figure 6 plots the mean and 68 percent probability band for responses of gov-
ernment spending and private consumption to a serially correlated shock to Gt nor-
malized to equal $1 in the initial period. We compute impact multipliers to be
comparable to empirical work. Private consumption responds strongly on impact,
with a mean jump of over 80 cents. The multiplier remains positive for about six
quarters before turning mildly negative. Multipliers in this range are reported by
Monacelli and Perotti (2008) for U.S. data, though their estimates imply a weak ini-
tial response of consumption that gradually builds to a peak 8 to 10 quarters after the
shock. Our simple model has little internal propagation, so the large impact eﬀect
13In simulations where the regime realizations produce active monetary and active ﬁscal policy,
debt temporarily assumes a nonstationary path because neither the monetary or ﬁscal authority
is acting in a manner that ensures long-run solvency. When the doubly active regime persists too
long, the solution moves far oﬀ the grid for the discretized state space and approximation errors can
produce imply economically infeasible solutions. We discard any draws that exhibit such behavior,
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and rapid decay are to be expected. Nonetheless, the ﬁgure shows that the setup
in which monetary and ﬁscal regimes ﬂuctuate over time is capable of generating
consumption responses of the magnitude observed in U.S. time series.
8. Simulating Fiscal Simulus: The 2009 ARRA
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is the ﬁscal stimulus pack-
aged passed by Congress with the primary intention of stabilizing economic activity
following the sharp decline in output late in 2008. The total size of the package is
$787 billion and comprises both additional government spending and tax cuts. This
section illustrates that the likely impact of the stimulus rests with how monetary
and ﬁscal policies are expected to respond going forward.
In line with the focus of the paper thus far, we analyze the impact of the additional
purchases containedin the stimuluspackage. The stimulus package contains spending
on infrastructure, healthcare, energy, and so forth and it includes $144 billion in
federal transfers to state and local governments. These transfers do not necessarily
need to go toward increasing purchases, but instead could be used to avoid tax hikes
or borrowing. Following Romer and Bernstein (2009) and Cogan, Cwik, Taylor,
and Wieland (2009), we assume that 60 percent of the transfers to state and local
governments go toward increasing purchases. Using this assumption, Cogan, Cwik,
Taylor, and Wieland (2009) report the increase in government purchases, on a yearly
basis, due to the stimulus package.
Figure 7 compares the paths of several variables in response to the path of the
additional government purchases from the ARRA as estimated from Cogan, Cwik,
Taylor, and Wieland (2009). The government spending stimulus, depicted in the
third panel in the left column, is injected into the economy as a sequence of shocks.
We compute responses under both AM/PF and PM/AF. Under AM/PF (solid lines),
the active monetary response drives up the real rate in response to the increase
in purchases. Total output and inﬂation, however, follow a hump-shape and peak
roughly at the same time as the peak in government purchases. Fiscal ﬁnancing of
the increase in spending occurs very gradually, with both debt and taxes above their
steady state levels for many years.
Under PM/AF (dashed lines), passive monetary policy allows the real interest rate
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above its steady state level about ﬁve quarters after the initial impulse. Relatively
high inﬂation erodes the real value of outstanding debt, leaving it considerably below
its level in the AM/PF regime.
To obtain a sense of how much future variability can be attributed to shifts in
policy regime, ﬁgure 8 reports the mean response of a monte carlo exercise that uses
the Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009) path for government purchases, but
randomly draws over regimes. Dashed lines represent two-standard deviation bands
computed at each point in time. The initial regime is set to PM/AF, so the initial
rise in government purchases is often occurring under this same regime, since it is
relatively persistent. Persistence of the regime causes the mean response of the real
rate to fall, but then assumes a less certain path as the eﬀect of some draws of active
monetary policy are realized.
8.1. Fiscal Foresight. Table 5 formally quantiﬁes the ARRA path of Cogan, Cwik,
Taylor, and Wieland (2009) in terms of output multipliers. One issue that arises in
such computations is whether agents fully internalize the future path of govern-
ment purchases, or are surprised each period—that is, they have no foresight about
the stimulus package. One method to incorporate foresight is to modify the pro-
cess for government purchases by adding moving average terms to the government
purchase process and convert it to an ARMA(1,5). We calibrate the moving av-
erage coeﬃcients using a minimum distance estimator based on the Cogan, Cwik,
Taylor, and Wieland (2009) path and impulse response of the ARMA(1,5). Under
the ARMA(1,5) process, a shock to purchases implies a path similar to that of the
ARRA, except agents have full knowledge of its trajectory. The ARMA(1,5) adds ﬁve
state variables, which renders the nonlinear solution method for the regime-switching
model impractical. To obtain a sense of how important ﬁscal foresight is, we move
to a linear ﬁxed-regime setting.
The top portion of table 5 reports the multipliers under the assumption of no
foresight. A similar pattern emerges as in the regime-switching setting following the
AR(1) shock, except the multipliersunder the PM/AF regime are considerably larger.
Under foresight, however, agents have knowledge of the rising level of purchases so
substantially revise up their expectations of future inﬂation in response to a shock.
The passive monetary response causes a sharp drop in the real rate and the large
present-value multiplier, which is 4.83 after ﬁve quarters under PM/AF. In contrast,
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which pushes the real rate higher relative to the case of no foresight and dampens
the multiplier.
8.2. What If Monetary Policy Becomes Active? In both of the regimes in ﬁg-
ure 7, inﬂation rises. In the regime that probably best describes policy behavior
through 2008 and 2009, passive monetary/active ﬁscal policy, inﬂation rises substan-
tially for several years. A plausible response of the Federal Reserve to rising inﬂation
is to switch to being active. In the absence of a coordinated switch in ﬁscal policy
to a passive stance, both policies would be active, at least for a time. If regime were
ﬁxed and both policies were active, no equilibrium would exist. In the present envi-
ronment, because agents anticipate the active/active regime will not persist forever,
the economy can visit such a regime periodically and temporarily. As the estimated
policy rules suggest, the U.S. economy resided in an active/active regime for much
of the 1980s [see ﬁgure 3].
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Figure 9 superimposes the paths of macroeconomic variables given the government
spending associated with the ARRA when policy is doubly active onto the paths in
ﬁgure 7. Active monetary/active ﬁscal policies produce markedly diﬀerent paths
for macro variables: inﬂation rises and remains well above its initial level; output
and consumption boom; the real interest rate falls; government debt grows with no
tendency to be stabilized. By conditioning on remain in the active/active regime,
this counterfactual generates a sequence of surprisingly low tax realizations, which
boosts demand for consumption goods and induces ﬁrms to demand more labor. At
the same time, because inﬂation is unexpectedly high each period, the ex-post real
interest rate falls. Falling real rates allows the present value of surpluses to rise, even
though tax revenues are falling.
In sum, the switch of monetary policy to ﬁghting inﬂation is doomed to failure
because ﬁscal policy does not simultaneously switch to raising taxes to stabilize debt.
Although the economy experiences a boom, it does so by generating chronically
higher inﬂation and a growing ratio of government debt to GDP.
14Davig(2005) studies the implicationsfor empirical tests of the government’s intertemporal bud-
get constraint of an environment in which periodically government debt grows at an unsustainable
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9. Conclusion
This paper has embedded estimated Markov-switching rules for U.S. monetary
and ﬁscal policy into an otherwise conventional calibrated DSGE model with nom-
inal rigidities to deliver some quantitative predictions of the impacts of government
spending increases. When monetary and ﬁscal policy regimes vary—from active
monetary/passive ﬁscal to passive monetary/active ﬁscal to doubly passive to dou-
bly active—government spending multipliers can vary widely. An increase in govern-
ment spending of $1 in present value raises output by $0.80 in present value under
AM/PF, while it raises output by as much as $1.80 in present value when monetary
policy is passive. In our simple model, this translates into a decrease in consumption
of $0.20 in present value under AM/PF, but and increase in consumption of about
$0.80 in present value under passive monetary policy.
The paper also simulates the general equilibrium impacts of the government spend-
ing path implied by the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. When
the government spending path is modeled as a sequence of shocks to spending, the
present-value multiplier for output is about $0.68 under a ﬁxed regime of AM/PF,
while it can be well over $3.00 in a ﬁxed PM/AF regime. If the government spending
path is treated as foreseen by economic agents—because the path is announced by
the passage of the Act—the present-value multiplier for output falls somewhat when
the regime is AM/PF, but it rises to nearly $5.00 in the short run when policy obeys
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Appendix A. Data Description: Fiscal Variables
The ﬁscal policy variables we use in estimating the switching ﬁscal rule (25) are
at a quarterly frequency and deﬁned as follows:
• τt = (Federal Receipts - Federal Transfers)/(Nominal GDP)
– Federal Receipts: Line 1 of NIPA Table 3.2
– Federal Transfers: Line 21 of NIPA Table 3.2




(Market value of privately heldgross federal debt)t−j/(Nominal GDP)t−j
– Debt series available from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas website
• yt = ln(Nominal GDP/Nominal CBO potential GDP)
– Nominal CBO potential GDP available from Congressional Budget Oﬃce
website
• gt = (Nominal Federal government consumption expenditures and gross in-
vestment)/(Nominal GDP)
– Nominal Federal government consumption expenditures and gross in-
vestment: Line 21 of NIPA Table 1.1.5POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 26
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Active Passive
State SM
t = 1 SM
t = 2 SM
t = 3 SM
t = 4
α0 .0068 .0068 .0058 .0058
(.0005) (.0005) (.0002) (.0002)
απ 1.2936 1.2936 .5305 .5305
(.062) (.062) (.02) (.02)
αy .0249 .0249 .0485 .0485
(.005) (.005) (.0046) (.0046)
σ2
r 1.61615e-005 9.18552e-007 2.07447e-005 5.51202e-007
(9.67157e-006) (1.95885e-006) (3.4185e-006) (1.75348e-006)
Table 1. Monetary policy rule estimates. Log likelihood value = −1079.52.
State SF













Table 2. Tax policy rule estimates. Log likelihood value = −820.76.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 31
PV (∆Y )
PV (∆G) after
Regime 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
AM/PF .79 .80 .84 .86
PM/PF 1.64 1.51 1.39 1.37





PV (∆G) − 1.
Table 3. Present value multipliers from the regime-switching model.
%∆P after
Regime 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters
AM/PF .76 1.34 2.37
PM/PF 2.19 3.18 3.98
PM/AF 2.41 3.40 3.95
Table 4. Impact of a 3% increase in government purchases on the
price level in the regime-switching model.
PV (∆Y )
PV (∆G) after
Regime 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
No Foresight—AR(1)
AM/PF .68 .68 .68 .68
PM/AF 3.29 2.88 2.41 2.3
Foresight—ARMA(1,5)
AM/PF .52 .61 .63 .63
PM/AF 4.83 3.10 2.31 2.17
Table 5. Present value multipliers from the ﬁxed-regime model; with
and without foresight.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 32













Active Monetary Policy, Low σ




Passive Monetary Policy, High σ




Passive Monetary Policy, Low  σ
Figure 1. Monetary Regime ProbabilitiesPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 33

















Figure 2. U.S. Fiscal Regime Probabilities
 
 




PM,AF − Fiscal Theory
Figure 3. U.S. Monetary and Fiscal RegimesPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 34






























































































Figure 4. Responses to a shock to government purchases, condition-
ing on remaining in the prevailing regime. In deviations from steady
state. Time units in quarters.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 35


































































































Figure 5. Responses of ﬁscal variables to a shock to government pur-
chases, conditioning on remaining in the prevailing regime. In devia-
tions from steady state. Time units in quarters.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 36







Response of Government Spending








Figure 6. Government spending impact multipliers for consumption
from VARﬁt to simulateddata from the regime-switchingmodel. Time
units in quarters.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 37


















































































Figure 7. Impacts of the government spending path implied by the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, conditioning on
either active monetary/passive ﬁscal (AM/PF) policy (solid lines) and
passive monetary/active ﬁscal (PM/AF) policy (dashed lines) regime.
In deviations from steady state. Time units in quarters.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 38














































































Figure 8. Simulating the 2009 ARRA randomly drawing over future
monetary and ﬁscal regimes, including two-standard deviation error
bands. Initial regime is passive monetary/active ﬁscal. In deviations
from steady state. Time units in quarters.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND FISCAL STIMULUS 39




















































































Figure 9. Impacts of the government spending path implied by the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, conditioning on
active monetary/active ﬁscal (AM/AF) regime (dotted-dashed lines).
Also depictedare active monetary/passive ﬁscal (AM/PF) policy (solid
lines) and passive monetary/active ﬁscal (PM/AF) policy regimes
(dashed lines). In deviations from steady state. Time units in quarters.